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INTRODUCTION 
Modern laws are normally enacted by a legislature or developed 
by a judiciary. However, there has been another traditional source of 
social order throughout history-customs, which are "popular, nor-
mative pattern[s] that reflect the common understandings of valid, 
compulsory rights and obligations." 1 Although such customs and cus-
tomary rights have long been part of the law applicable to land, water, 
and resources connected thereto, the Supreme Court of the United 
States' decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council2 has ele-
vated the importance of custom by naming it as a potential defense to 
categorical takings claims. 
A customary-Dr customary law-most broadly defined, is a practice 
or right of use exercised by a discrete and identifiable group of people 
(a tribe or native peoples, for example) over a particular area ofland 
for a very long time and is recognized for certain purposes in a local 
court or tribunal. In most countries, the customary law may be modi-
fied or abolished by statute, ordinance, or rule enacted by government, 
generally through a legislative act. Thereafter, the precise definition 
and scope of custom as law usually depends upon the nature and his-
tory of the nation in which customary rights are claimed or exercised. 
This Article summarizes the modern emergence of customary law 
in the United States and internationally. It discusses two distinct 
forms of customary law, the first being custom, as recognized in En-
glish common law and discussed by Blackstone and the second being 
"native customs" that are exercised by indigenous peoples. Section II 
discusses Blackstone's definition of custom and the importance of 
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custom in real property as a source of law in derogation of so-called 
common law. Section III explores native custom, with emphasis on 
the State ofHawai'i, which constitutionally protects the "traditional 
and customary" rights of Native Hawaiians, and on select foreign 
jurisdictions in which custom, often exercised by or in favor of in dig-
enous peoples, plays a strong role in the law relating to land, water, 
natural resources, and self-government. Section IV analyzes the 
significance of custom within the United States as a background prin-
ciple of a state's law of property, which gives state and local gov-
ernment a safe haven from liability under the categorical or total 
regulatory taking rules set out by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Lucas. As this Article will demonstrate, poorly defined cus-
tomary law runs the risk of intruding onto fundamental property 
rights such as the right to exclude. Judicial adherence to some form 
of the Blackstonian criteria for good customs would significantly 
ameliorate such dangers. 
1. ENGLISH CUSTOM 
A. Background 
The most common and universal definition of custom finds its roots 
in the writings of the English legal scholar William Blackstone. It is 
described in his legendary Commentaries on Laws of England, many 
editions of which were published shortly after the middle of the 
eighteenth century. 3 
Blackstone wrote his commentaries, at least in part, as a polemic 
in favor of the common law and to buttress it against anything that 
might serve to weaken it. It is in this context that his commentaries 
on custom must be read. Indeed, Blackstone recognized three forms 
of customary law: common law ("general custom") by which he pre-
sumably meant common law as we view it today, court (procedural) 
custom of particular tribunals or courts, and "particular customs" 
practiced by and affecting the inhabitants of a defined geographical 
area. It is this third, or "particular," custom that Blackstone took care 
to carefully define and delimit, arguably because he viewed it as a 
threat to the common-law tradition that he espoused and for which 
he argues in the Commentaries. 
3. Although not to the extent of another similar doctrine, the public trust doctrine. 
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Blackstone set out seven criteria that a customary right or practice 
must meet if it is to be a "good" custom-that is, one which is enforce-
able against a common-law principle or tradition, say, of exclusive 
possession of private land (a situation in which many of the disputes 
over custom arose). But Blackstone did not draw these seven princi-
ples from the air. Although he cited comparatively few cases, he was 
declaring the law pretty much as it had developed by the middle of 
the eighteenth century and, indeed, as it continued to develop well 
into the nineteenth century. To be valid, to be enforceable, to result in 
a right of an individual despite common-law principles to the contrary, 
a custom had to be immemorial, continuous, peaceable, reasonable, 
certain, compulsory, and consistent. Even today, the law of custom is 
hedged around by requirements, most of which derive directly from 
Blackstone's seven criteria. 
Thus, for example, a recent volume ofHalsbury's Laws ofEngland4 
describes the essential attributes of custom as follows: 
To be valid, a custom must have four essential attributes: (1) it 
must be immemorial, (2) it must be reasonable, (3) it must be cer-
tain in its terms and in respect both of the locality where it is al-
leged to obtain and of the persons whom it is alleged to effect, 
(4) it must have continued as a right and without interruption 
since its immemorial origin. These characteristics serve as a prac-
tical purpose as rules of evidence when the existence of a custom 
is to be established or refuted. 5 
Even so practical a source as a standard reference book oflaw for 
local government councilors has the following entry: 
Custom 
If a right is given to or an obligation imposed upon all the 
Queen's subj ects, it must be established by authority of the general 
law. A local custom can therefore never be general and a custom-
ary claim in the name of the general public will fail. Similarly a 
custom must be capable of definition, and so the courts will not 
4. 12(1) HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND (1998). 
5. Id. '\1606, at 160. This entire section on custom is a superb explanation of custom today, 
prepared by one of the preeminent scholars in legal history, Professor J.H. Baker, Fellow of 
St. Catharine's College, Cambridge. 
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uphold a claim on behalf of a class whose membership cannot 
be ascertained. 6 
It is the seven rules or criteria applicable to particular custom 
(not common law, not special court rules, but land rights in deroga-
tion of common law particular to a particular and limited jurisdic-
tion and exercised by a small and definite population) which courts 
have dealt with, and which still form the basis for English discussion 
and categorization of customary law. 7 These are: 
1. Immemoriality 
That is have been used so long, that the memory of man runneth 
not to the contrary. So that if anyone can shew the beginning of 
it, it is no good custom. For which reason no custom can prevail 
against an express act of parliament, since the statute itself is a 
proof of a time when such a custom did not exist.s 
For centuries, "time out of memory" had a fixed, well-defined, and 
accepted meaning. The phrase is a common one in setting up a cus-
tom as a defense against what would otherwise be an unlawful act. 
2. Continuity 
It must have been continued. Any implementation would cause a 
temporary ceasing: the revival gives it a new beginning, which 
will be within time of memory, and thereupon the custom will be 
void. But this must be understood with regard to an interruption 
of the possession only, for ten or twenty years, will not destroy the 
custom. As if I have a right of way by custom over another's field, 
the custom is not destroyed, though I do not pass over it for ten 
years; it only becomes more difficult to prove: but if the right be 
any how discontinued for a day, the custom is quite at an end.9 
3. Peacefulness 
It must have been peaceable, and acquiesced in; not subject to 
contention and dispute. For as customs owe their original to 
6. CHARLES ARNOLD-BAKER, LOCAL COUNCIL ADMINISTRATION 35 (Butterworths, 4th 
ed.1994). 
7. See HALSBURY'S, supra note 4. 
8. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *76-77. 
9. Id. at *77. 
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common consent, their being immemorially disputed either at 
law or otherwise is a proof that such consent was wanting. 10 
4. Reasonableness 
Customs must be reasonable; or rather, taken negatively, they 
must not be unreasonable. Which is always, as Sir Edward Coke 
says, to be understood of every unlearned man's reason. but of ar-
tificial and legal reason, warranted by authority of a law. Upon 
which account a custom may be good, though the particular rea-
son of it cannot be assigned; for it sufficeth, if no good legal rea-
son can be assigned against it. Thus, a custom in a parish, that no 
man shall put his beasts into the common till the third of October, 
would be good; and yet it would be hard to shew the reason why 
that day in particular is fixed upon, rather than the day before or 
after. But a custom that no cattle shall be put in till the lord of the 
manor first put in his, is unreasonable, and therefore bad: for per-
adventure the lord will never put in his; and then the tenants will 
lose all their profits. 11 
155 
The early twentieth-century cases of Mercer v. Denne,12 upholding 
custom of the inhabitants of a parish (fishermen) to use a piece of 
land covered with shingle to spread and dry their nets as in favor of 
navigation, permitted the exercise of the custom to change with the 
times so long as the burden on the landowner was not unreasonable: 
The tanning, clutching or oiling of nets [new] belonging to fisher-
men tend to preserve the nets and make them useful for a longer 
period, and the subsequent drying of nets seems to me to fall 
within the reasons thus assigned for the custom. It is laid down by 
Holt, J. in City of London v. Vanacore 13 [a late seventeenth-cen-
tury case] that "general customs may be extended to new things 
which are within the reason of those customs." There is not, in 
my opinion, evidence from which it ought to be inferred that the 
practice of tanning or cutching has arisen within the time of 
legal memory. But it was said that, so far as related to the drying 
after oiling, the use has extended over a period of from twenty-
five to thirty-five years only, and, moreover, that this user was 
1O.Id. 
11. Id. 
12. 2 Ch. 534 (1904); 2 Ch. 538 (C.A.) (1905). 
13. 12 Mod 270, 271 (1699). 
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more burdensome than the old user for drying after tanning or 
cutching. I think, however, that the law as laid down by Lord St. 
Leonards in Dyce v. Hay cited by Farwell J., applies, and that 
those who are entitled to the benefit of a custom ought not to be 
deprived of that benefit simply because they take advantage of 
modern inventions or new operations so long as they do not 
thereby throw an unreasonable burden on the landowner. 14 
Again, "[i]t must not be forgotten that the persons claiming under 
the custom are bound to exercise their rights reasonably and with due 
regard to the interest of the owner of the soil." 15 
5. Certainty 
Customs ought to be certain. A custom, that lands shall descend 
to the most worthy of the owner's blood, is void; for how shall this 
worth be determined? But a custom to descend to the next male 
of the blood, exclusive offemales, is certain, and therefore good. 
A custom, to pay two pence an acre in lieu of tithes, is good; but to 
pay sometimes two pence and sometimes three pence, as the oc-
cupier of the land pleases, is bad for its uncertainty. Yet a custom, 
to pay a years improved value for a fine on a copyhold estate, is 
good: though the value is a thing uncertain. For the value may at 
any time be ascertained; and the maxim of the law is, id certum 
est, quod certum reddi potest. 16 
(a) Certainty of Practice 
(b) Certainty of Locale 
(c) Certainty of Persons 
6. Compulsory 
Customs, though established by consent, must be (when estab-
lished) compulsory; and not left to the option of every man, 
whether he will use them or not. Therefore a custom, that all the 
inhabitants shall be rated toward the maintenance of a bridge, will 
be good; but a custom, that every many is to contribute thereto 
14. 2 Ch. 538, 581 (1905) (emphasis added). 
15. Id. at 584 (1905). 
16. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *78. 
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at his own pleasure, is idle and absurd; and, indeed, no custom 
at all. 17 
157 
The concept that a custom must be compulsory in order for it to be 
good is for the most part self-evident; a law is not a law if it is not 
obligatory to the parties. This issue is rarely addressed separately 
because most of the cases on custom assume that a custom is com-
pulsory. 
7. Consistency 
Lastly, customs must be consistent with each other: one custom 
cannot be set up in opposition to another. For, ifboth are really 
customs, then both are of equal antiquity, and both established by 
mutual consent: which to say of contradictory customs is absurd. 
Therefore, if one man prescribes that by custom he has a right to 
have windows looking into another's garden; the other cannot 
claim a right by custom to stop up or obstruct those windows: for 
these two contradictory customs cannot both be good, nor both 
stand together. He ought rather to deny the existence of the 
former custom. 18 
As with the compulsory requirement, the criterion of consistency is 
largely self-evident and does not appear often in the cases on cus-
tomary law. 
These, then, are Blackstone's seven criteria for" good" customs, as 
interpreted by both contemporaries and later courts in England. 
Since customary rights in land are in derogation of common-law 
rights in land-particularly the fundamental right to exclude others-
it makes sense for such customary rights to be limited in their ex-
ercise. Blackstone's criteria present such reasonable limitations. 
Moreover, most courts cite Blackstone as authority for their customary 
law. It is not altogether apparent that they understand it, however. 
B. The Current State of Customary Law in the United Kingdom 
and the Republic of Ireland 
It is clear that courts within the United Kingdom-as well as 
within other countries directly influenced by English common law, 
17. Id. (emphasis added). 
18. Id. (emphasis added). 
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such as the Republic ofIreland-continue to give customary practices 
the force of law when applicable. 
In Spread Trustee Company Ltd. v Sarah Ann Hutcheson & 
Others,19 the Court of Appeals of Guernsey considered the issue of 
whether managers of a trustee were permitted to include a clause in 
the trust instrument that excluded liability for gross negligence?O 
In 1989, Guernsey had passed a trusts law ("The Trust Statute"), 
amended in 1990, which had prohibited the exclusion ofliability for 
gross negligence in trust instruments?1 However, the gross negli-
gence at issue had occurred in transactions prior to 1989, before the 
Trust Statute and amendment were passed. 22 Therefore, the court 
undertook to discover the law regarding the exclusion ofliability for 
gross negligence in trust instruments in Guernsey prior to 1989. The 
court noted that there were no prior Guernsey statutes regarding 
trusts and no court cases on point. 23 It therefore looked to Guernsey 
customary law.24 
Both parties attempted to introduce favorable evidence about 
Guernsey customary law?5 The court, after reviewing the common 
law of Guernsey, found that there was no reliable evidence on the 
customary law. It considered a letter that the Guernsey Finance Com-
mittee sent to the Guernsey President, which noted uncertainty re-
garding the law of trusts in Guernsey and stated that the Trust 
Statute was intended to replace Guernsey customary law on the 
subject. 26 The court concluded that the best evidence of Guernsey 
customary law on trusts prior to 1989 was the text of the Statute 
that replaced the customary law.27 Accordingly, the court held that 
prior to the enactment of the Trust Statute, Guernsey customary 
law contained the same prohibition against including a term in the 
trust instrument that excluded liability for gross negligence?8 
19. Spread Tr. Co. Ltd v. Hutcheson, [2011] UKPC 13 (Guernsey). Official Press Summary 
available at http://www.bailii.org/uk/casesfUKPC/2011113.(image1).pdf. 
20. Id. at [4]. 
21. Id. at [2]. 
22. Id. at [4]. 
23. Id. at [12]. 
24. Id. at [13]-[16]. 
25.Id. 
26. Id. at [15]. 
27. Id. at [37]. 
28.Id. 
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Crown Estate Commissioners v. Roberts & Anor29 provides another 
example of the contemporary use of customary law by courts within 
the United Kingdom. In 2002, the Pembroke shire County Council 
applied to the Crown Estates Commissioners in order to register lease-
hold titles to a large part of the foreshore of the Pembrokeshire coast-
line, operating under the assumption that the foreshore and sea in 
the area belonged to the Crown.30 Mr. Roberts, as successor in title to 
the Bishop of St. Davids, alleged that he had estate over the area as 
a result of a charter of 1115 AD.31 In addition, Mr. Roberts argued 
that he had rights to the area as a result of ancient usage. 32 Mr. 
Roberts claimed the rights to the following: sea wrecks, wharfage, 
sporting, a private fishery, treasure trove, profits, estrays, and other 
rights. 33 The England and Wales High Court, Chancery Division, 
decided the case. 
In assessing most of the rights, the court looked to the charter and 
other subsequent treaties and legislative acts.34 However, the court 
considered Welsh customary law antedating the Norman conquest 
in evaluating Mr. Robert's asserted fishing, treasure trove, and es-
tray rights. The court noted that Welsh customary laws survived in 
a collection of manuscripts known as the Hywel Dda. 35 The charter 
granting the land to the Bishop of St. Davids in 1115 AD had granted 
"any existing customary rights" to the Bishops. Mr. Roberts argued 
that existing customary rights granted by the charter included exclu-
sive fishing rights to the sea. 36 After considering evidence of Welsh 
customary law, the court determined that ancient Welsh princes did 
not assert a right to a private ocean fishery, which meant that the 
Bishop of St. Davids, and by extension Mr. Roberts, possessed no such 
right. 37 In considering a customary right to treasure trove, the court 
found that customary law, in keeping with modern law, granted the 
right to treasure to the Crown. 38 However, the court did mention in 
29. Crown Estate Comm'ners v. Roberts & Anor, [2008] EWHC 1302 (Ch), available at http:// 
www.bailii.org!ew!casesIEWHC!Ch!2008!1302.html. 
30. Id. at [3]. 
31. Id. at [4]. 
32.Id. 
33. Id. at [5]. 
34. Id. at [39]. 
35. Id. at [85]. 
36. Id. at [84]. 
37. Id. at [90], [115]. 
38. Id. at [129]. 
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dicta that it was willing to accept that Mr. Roberts had a customary 
right to estrays.39 
Similarly, the Republic ofIreland continues to adhere to the com-
mon law tradition of recognizing customs as law. In Walsh & Anor 
v. Sligo County Council, 40 the High Court of Ireland considered a case 
in which the plaintiffbought an enormous property that included pop-
ular access paths. The plaintiff installed a gate across the paths, thus 
blocking out the general public, and filed suit seeking a declaration 
that no public right of way existed over his property.41 In its counter-
claim, the County Council argued that the plaintiffs predecessor in 
interest dedicated the paths to the public. However, in the alterna-
tive, the Council argued that the public had customary rights through 
long usage to pass over the property.42 Although the court noted that 
the onus was on the defendants to prove the existence of any custom-
ary right,43 it did not reach the issue of custom because it held that 
the path had been acquired by prescription.44 
However, as noted in the introduction, the United Kingdom's 
legislature retains the power to alter or abolish a custom. For exam-
ple, the United Kingdom has enacted statutes to regulate town and 
village greens ("TVGs"), an area traditionally governed by custom. 
According to the common law, TVGs were theoretically established 
by customary recreational usage since time immemoria1.45 
In 1965, the legislature enacted the Commons Registration Act, 
which brought TVGs under statutory protection. 46 Section 22(1) of 
the Commons Registration Act of 1965 contained a definition of a 
TVG as land" on which the inhabitants of any locality have a custom-
ary right to indulge in lawful sports or pastimes."47 Despite this recog-
nition, the Commons Registration Act explicitly ended the traditional 
39. Id. at [92]. 
40. Walsh & Anorv. Sligo Cnty. Council [2010] !EHC 437 (Ire.), available at http://www 
.bailii.org/ie/casesIIEHC/20 101H 437 .html. 
41. Id. at [6]. 
42. Id. at [7]. 
43. Id. at [31]. 
44. Id. at [299]. 
45. Oxfordshire CC v. Oxford City Council [2006] 2 WLR 1235 (Eng.) (describing the 
traditional legal status of a village green as an area "that by immemorial custom the inhabitants 
of the town, village, or parish should have acquired the right of playing lawful games thereon 
and enjoying it for purposes of recreation"). 
46. R v. Oxfordshire Cnty. Council ex parte Sunningwell Parish Council, [2000]1 AC 335 
(H.L.). 
47.Id. 
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role of custom in the establishment ofTVGs. Instead, the Commons 
Registration Act brought the creation ofTVGs into a state regulatory 
framework by mandating that TVGs would not be legally recognized 
unless registered by a certain deadline. 48 
The Commons Act of 2006, which replaced the Commons Regis-
tration Act, was enacted by the legislature to "modernize the law on 
commons and town and village greens."49 The Commons Act made, 
among other things, procedural changes to the process ofregistering 
TVGs established by prescription. 50 The Act did nothing to reintro-
duce the role of customary law in the establishment ofTVGs and thus 
solidified the fact that statutory law exclusively governs TVGS. 51 
II. NATIVE CUSTOM 
Fred Bosselman and Peter Orebech have argued that "[c]ustomary 
law exists whenever people act as if they were legally bound to accept 
customary rules ... [and that no] endorsement by any legislative, ju-
dicial, or administrative body is needed to create customary law ifpeo-
pIe accept rules as the law."52 In this sense, "native customary law" 
can be loosely defined as the complex networks of customs that or-
dered behavior, defined social norms, structured economics and poli-
tics, and regulated natural resources in many indigenous societies. In 
much of the world, colonization by Europeans replaced indigenous sys-
tems of customary law with Western-style positivistic law. However, 
many native groups continue to structure their lives and identities 
around traditional customary law, and some have begun to strive for 
formal legal recognition of that fact. The following selected case stud-
ies' from within the United States and abroad, explore the complexi-
ties that result when native customary law is resurrected in nations 
that are governed by modern common law and statutory frameworks. 
48. Id. (explaining that the under the section 2(2) of the Act, "no land capable of being reg-
istered under the Act was to be deemed to be common land or a town or village green unless 
so registered ... mean[ing] that unless they were registered within the prescribed time-limit, 
they could not be registered as such thereafter"). 
49. Alec Samuels, The Commons Act 2006, J. PLANNING & ENVTL L. 1652, 1652 (2006). 
50.Id. 
51. Id. 
52. FredBosselman & Peter Orebech, Conclusion: Customary Law in a Globalizing Culture, 
in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 445, 445 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2005). 
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A. Hawai'i 
Customary law in Hawai'i represents a harder and certainly more 
sweeping situation than is the case with the English custom discussed 
above. Hawai'i presents more difficulty because there is no question 
that some tradition of customary rights exists from the days of the 
various kingdoms, rights that include gathering, access, and reli-
gious customary practices. This tradition predates not only statehood 
but also territorial days and annexation towards the end of the nine-
teenth century. The size of applicable territory is usually broader 
and the class far larger than Blackstonian custom would tolerate, al-
though, again, long-standing-if not ancient-practice is usually a 
prerequisite, and formal governmental action to the contrary gener-
ally takes precedence. 
As explained inA Treatise on Native Hawaiian Law, "[a]nimportant 
foundation oflaw in Hawaii is the doctrine of custom." 53 Until the es-
tablishment of the Western-style kingdom ofHawai'i in 1839, Native 
Hawaiians lived in a traditionally organized society governed entirely 
by "ancient Hawaiian custom and usage."54 Access rights from the 
mountains to the sea and along the coastline,55 as well as religious, 
cultural, and subsistence-gathering practices, were important cus-
toms that sustained native tenants. 56 Even as Western influence 
radically transformed Native Hawaiian society, many traditional cus-
tomary rights were codified in the first constitution and statutory 
compilations of the Kingdom ofHawai'i from 1839 to 1842.57 Moreover, 
between 1845 and 1855, laws recognizing the customary rights of 
native tenants "were an integral part of the transformation of Hawaii' s 
ancient communal land tenure system to a modern property regime 
incorporating Western concepts of private property rights .... "58 
Accordingly, although modern property law in Hawai'i is primarily 
based on Western common law, it also incorporates Hawaiian custom 
and usage. 59 
53. Susan K. Serrano & David M. Forman, Traditional and Customary Access and Gathering 
Rights, in ATREATISE ON NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW *17 (MacKenzie, Serrano & Sproat, eds., Univ. 
of Hawai'i Press & Kamehameha Publishing, 2014). 
54. Id. at *2. 
55. See id. at *3. 
56.Id. 
57. Id. at *7-11. 
58. Id. at *11. 
59. Id. at *15. 
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Over the last thirty years, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has inter-
preted the state constitution and several state statutes to confer 
distinct legal status on Native Hawaiian customary practices, often 
to the detriment of Western-style absolute property rights. The 
court has recognized a specific right for Hawaiians to practice cus-
tomary subsistence gathering of certain items, 60 as well as a broader 
right to exercise traditional and customary rights on undeveloped 
private property.61 
1. Modern Legal Bases of Native Hawaiian Customary Rights 
a. Section 7-1 
In 1850, the Kingdom of Hawai'i enacted the Kuleana Act, which 
provided that Native Hawaiian tenants could acquire fee simple 
ownership over lands that they traditionally cultivated.62 In order 
to ensure that native tenants could use their new lands sustainably, 
section 7 of the Kuleana Act granted such tenants the right to gather 
enumerated items such as firewood and house-building supplies from 
elsewhere within the ahupua'a63 of his or her residence.64 Section 7 is 
the sole provision of the Kuleana Act that remains in force in the mod-
ern statutory scheme, now codified as Haw. Rev. Stat. section 7_1.65 
In the 1982 case of Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust CO.,66 the Hawai'i 
Supreme Court held that gathering rights could be exercised pursuant 
to section 7-1 if three conditions were satisfied. As explained by A 
Treatise on Native Hawaiian Law, the three conditions are as follows: 
(1) the tenant must physically reside within the ahupua' a from which 
the item is being gathered, (2) the right to gather can only be exercised 
on undeveloped lands within the ahupua' a, and (3) the right must be 
exercised for the purpose of practicing Native Hawaiian traditions 
and customs.67 Section 7-1 is limited in scope; it only authorizes 
60. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
61. See infra notes 66-85 and accompanying text. 
62. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *17 n.72. 
63. An ahupua'a is a traditional designation of land in Hawai'i, which usually runs from a 
mountain valley to the adjacent ocean. 
64. Id. at *19. 
65. Id. at *18-19. 
66. 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982). 
67. See id. at 749-50; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *24. 
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Native Hawaiian practitioners to gather the items enumerated within 
the statute and only within the ahupua'a of their residence.68 Accord-
ingly, it could be better characterized as a statutory provision protect-
ing a few narrow ly defined customary rights than as one establishing 
custom as an independent source of law. 
b. Section 1-1 
Section 1-1 of Hawai'i Revised Statutes offers a broader legal 
foundation for Native Hawaiian customary rights. Enacted in 1892, 
it adopts English common law as the law of Hawai'i, except as "other-
wise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or by the laws of the State, orfixed by Hawaiianjudicialprece-
dent, or established by Hawaiian Usage." 69 Although section 1-1 does 
"not directly relate to traditional or customary gathering rights [,]" 70 
it does explicitly codify customary Hawaiian usage as a source oflaw. 71 
Accordingly, in recent years the Hawai'i Supreme Court has cited to 
it as the basis for extending formal legal status to customary gather-
ing rights.72 
In Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 73 the court interpreted Haw. Rev. 
Stat. section 1-1 broadly, holding that it "may be used as a vehicle for 
the continued existence of those customary rights which continue to 
be practiced and which worked no actual harm upon the recognized 
interests of others.,,74 Whether a Hawaiian tradition would be legally 
recognized as a Hawaiian usage under section 1-1 depended on a case-
by-case analysis into the practice of the custom in the particular 
area and a balancing of the "respective interests and harm .... "75 If 
a Hawaiian usage had, "without harm to anyone, been continued ... 
[section] 1-1 insure[d] [its] continuance for as long as no actual harm 
[was] done thereby."76 However, the court found that the plaintiff, 
68. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *34. 
69. HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (2013) (emphasis added). 
70. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *17. 
71. Id. at *18. 
72. Id. at *17. 
73. 656 P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982). 
74. See id. at 751-52; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *18. 
75. See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745,751-52 (Haw. 1982); see also Serrano 
& Forman, supra note 53, at *18. 
76. See Kalipi, 656 P.2d at 751; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *26. 
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Kalipi, could not take advantage of the section 1-1 because there was 
insufficient evidence to find that the traditional gathering rights that 
he asserted extended beyond the ahupua' a in which he lived. 
In Pele Defense Fund v. Paty,77 the court expanded the scope of 
Haw. Rev. Stat. section 1-1 by finding that customary and tradi-
tional gathering rights "may extend beyond the ahupua'a in which 
the Native Hawaiian practitioner resides .... "78 The court held that 
gathering rights could be exercised for subsistence, cultural, or reli-
gious purposes outside of the practitioner's ahupua'a as long as "such 
rights have been customarily and traditionally exercised in [that] 
manner.,,79 Pele Defense Fund was expressly reaffirmed in Public 
Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning Commission 
(,'PASH',),80 in which the court held that customary rights exercised 
pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. section 1-1 went beyond the "tenant's" 
gathering rights enumerated in Haw. Rev. Stat. section 7 -1 and were 
"dependent on the particular circumstances of the case.,,81 The court 
clarified that section 1-1 "represents the codification of custom as it 
applies [in Hawai'i]" and concluded that such custom renders the 
"western concept of exclusivity . . . not universally applicable" 
within the state.82 
c. Article XII, Section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution 
Finally, traditional and customary rights are protected under 
Article XII, section 7 of the state constitution of 1978.83 Article XII, 
section 7 was intended as a provision encompassing and reaffirming 
"all rights of native Hawaiian's such as access and gathering" but 
was not intended to "remove or eliminate any statutorily recognized 
rights ... of native Hawaiians .... "84 Importantly, the Hawai'i 
Supreme Court has held that section 7 imposes a constitutional 
77. 837 P.2d 1247 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 (1993). 
78. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *26. 
79. Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247, 1272 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 
(1993); see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *27. 
80. 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995). 
81. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *29 (citing Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii v. 
Hawaii Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995». 
82. Id. at *29 (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1268). 
83. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *16. 
84.Id. 
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obligation on the state judiciary to preserve and enforce Hawaiian 
traditional rights.85 The effect of this constitutional mandate is that 
"any argument for extinguishment of traditional rights based simply 
upon possible inconsistency ... with our modern system of land 
tenure must fai1."86 
Courts have often invoked Article XII section 7 in conjunction with 
Haw. Rev. Stat. section 1-1. Thus, the court inPele Defense Fund held 
that traditional and customary rights practiced for subsistence, cul-
tural, and religious purposes on undeveloped lands were not only au-
thorized by section 1-1 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes but also 
protected by the constitution.87 Similarly, inPASH, the court clarified 
that this constitutional obligation extended to protecting customary 
rights generally, beyond those "normally associated with tenancy in 
an ahupua' a."88 
2. The Substance of Hawaiian Customary Gathering 
Rights-a Defense to Trespass 
In sum, Native Hawaiian customary gathering practices have 
formal legal status in Hawai'i. Section 7-1 provides statutory au-
thority for the continuance of certain customary gathering practices, 
although its scope is limited. Section 1-1 provides that Native Ha-
waiian customs and usage are a legitimate source oflaw in Hawai'i. 
Courts have interpreted section 1-1 to offer broader protection for the 
exercise of traditional rights beyond those enumerated in section 7 -1. 
Finally, Article XII, section 7 of the Hawai'i Constitution obligates the 
state to protect "legitimate customary and traditional practices ... 
to the extent feasible .... "89 
The most striking effect of the Hawai'i Supreme Court's recognition 
of customary rights is on the property rights of landowners within 
the state. Because "Hawaii property law protects the exercise oftra-
ditional and customary rights and the concomitant limitation of the 
85. See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745, 748 (Haw. 1982); see also Serrano & 
Forman, supra note 53, at *26. 
86. See Kalipi, 656 P.2d at 748; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *34. 
87. See Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247, 1272 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918 
(1993); see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *27. 
88. See Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 
1269 (Haw. 1995); see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *29. 
89. See Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1272; see also Serrano & Forman, supra 
note 53, at *34. 
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owner's right of exclusion[,] ... the owner ofland in Hawaii acquires 
title that is uniquely subject to the rights of native tenants."90 The 
custom-imposed limitation on the owner's right of exclusion is best 
exemplified by the fact that the Hawai'i Supreme Court has recog-
nized that Native Hawaiian gathering rights can be asserted as a 
defense to trespass. 
In the 1998 criminal case of State v. Hanapi,91 the state charged 
Hanapi, a Native Hawaiian, with trespass after he repeatedly entered 
a neighbor's private property.92 Hanapi, appearing pro se, asserted 
Native Hawaiian customary rights as a defense, arguing that he en-
tered the property in order to "perform religious and traditional cere-
monies to heal the land" following the neighbor's grading and filling 
of an area near two traditional fishponds. 93 Although the Hawai'i Su-
preme Court convicted Hanapi of trespass, it nonetheless recognized 
the viability of the customary rights defense. The court identified 
three elements that a defendant must meet to render a trespass con-
stitutionally protected as a Native Hawaiian right. 94 
First, the defendant must qualify as a Native Hawaiian.95 InPASH, 
the Supreme Court defined a Native Hawaiian as a descendant of 
Native Hawaiians who inhabited the islands prior to 1778, rejecting 
a definition based on blood quantum. 96 The PASH opinion did not 
reach the issue of whether non-Hawaiian family members of Native 
Hawaiians would qualify.97 
Second, the defendant "must establish that his or her claimed right 
is constitutionally protected as a customary or traditional native Ha-
waiian practice .... "98 The Supreme Court ofHawai'i has determined 
that a custom must have been established in practice by November 25, 
1892.99 In Hanapi, the court held that the custom or usage could be 
proven by Kama'aina witness testimony.lOO 
90. See id. at *15. 
91. 970 P.2d 485 (Haw 1998). 
92. See id. at 492; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *36. 
93. See State v. Hanapi, 970 P.2d 485, 486, 488-89 (Haw. 1998); see also Serrano & Forman, 
supra note 53, at *36. 
94. See Hanapi, 970 P.2d at 493-94; see also Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *37. 
95. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *37. 
96. Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1270 
(Haw. 1995). 
97. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *37. 
98. Id. at *37-38 (quoting Hanapi, 970 P.2d at 494-95). 
99. Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1272. 
100. Hanapi, 970 P.2d at 494-95. 
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Finally, the defendant must prove that the right was exercised 
on undeveloped land .... 101 In PASH, the court explained that 
customary rights may be exercised on land that is undeveloped or 
"less than fully developed." 102 However, courts have not yet pinpointed 
the precise point in the development process at which land becomes 
"fully developed." 103 
More recently, in State v. Pratt, 104 the Hawai'i Intermediate Court 
of Appeals held that the three Hanapi elements are merely "the min-
imum a defendant has to show in support of a claim that his or her 
conduct was constitutionally protected [against trespass] as a native 
Hawaiian right." 105 The Supreme Court ofHawai'i affirmed and held 
that once the Hanapi elements are met, the court must apply a 
"totality of the circumstances test" to balance the competing interests 
of the practitioner and the state. 106 
3. Consistency with Blackstonian Custom 
Custom has been "incorporated into Hawaii's statutory framework 
for over a century." 107 The Kalipi court, in holding that Haw. Rev. Stat. 
section 1-1 codified the Hawaiian usage exception to the common law, 
analogized to the English doctrine of custom, although it recognized 
that "[not] all the requisite elements of the doctrine of custom were 
necessarily incorporated .... "108 More recently, A Treatise on Native 
Hawaiian Law has further explored the relationship between classic 
Blackstonian custom and customary law in Hawai'i.109 The authors 
of that Treatise analyzed the Supreme Court ofHawai'i's opinion in 
PASH and discerned seven elements of Hawaiian customary law to 
101. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *38 (citing Hanapi, 970 P.2d at 494-95). 
102. See Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1272; see also Serrano & Forman, supra 
note 53, at *18. 
103. See Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1272; see also Serrano & Forman, supra 
note 53, at *18. 
104. 124 Haw. 329 (Ct. App. 2010). 
105. Id. at 355. 
106. State v. Pratt, 277 P.3d 300 (Haw. 2012). 
107. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *18. 
108. See Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745,750-51 (Haw. 1982); see also Serrano 
& Forman, supra note 53, at *25. 
109. See Serrano & Forman, supra note 53, at *30-31. 
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be contrasted with the seven elements of Blackstonian custom. The 
seven elements of Native Hawaiian usage are as follows: 
(l)"The date by which Hawaiian usage must have been estab-
lished is fixed at November 25, 1892, rather than ... time 
immemorial." 110 
(2)"The right of each ahupua'a tenant to exercise traditional 
and customary practices remains intact, notwithstanding 
arguable abandonment of a particular site ... continuous 
exercise [of the right] is not required: the custom is not de-
stroyed ... it only becomes more difficult to prove." 111 
(3)The PASH court found that, at least in the context of Haw. 
Rev. Stat. section 7-1, there is no requirement that the prac-
tice be peaceable and free from dispute. 112 
(4),,[R]easonableness concerns the manner in which an other-
wise valid customary right is exercised-in other words, even 
if an acceptable rationale cannot be assigned, the custom is 
still recognized as long as there is no good legal reason 
against it." 113 
(5)"[A] particular custom is certain if it is objectively defined 
and applied .... " 114 
(6)In Hawaii a usage need not necessarily be compulsory, because 
"[t]he state has the authority under article XII, section 7 of the 
Hawai'i Constitution to reconcile competing interests ... 
once land has reached the point of 'full development' it may 
be inconsistent to allow or enforce the practice of traditional 
Hawaiian gathering rights ... [however,] the State does not 
have unfettered discretion to regulate these rights ... out of 
existence." 115 
(7)"Consistency is properly measured against other customs, 
not the spirit of present laws .... "116 
110. Id. at *30 (discussing Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii Cnty. Planning Comm'n, 
903 P.2d 1246, 1272 (Haw. 1995». 
111. Id. (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1262 n.26, 1272). 
112. Id. at 31 (discussing Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1267). 
113. Id. (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1268 n.39). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1262 n.26, 1272). 
116. Id. (quoting Pub. Access Shoreline Hawaii, 903 P.2d at 1268 n.39). 
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Notwithstanding the unquestionable legal and historical basis for 
some Native Hawaiian customary rights, these seven elements of 
Hawaiian usage clearly exceed the traditional bounds of Blackston ian 
custom. For example, the defined class and applicable territory of 
Native Hawaiian rights are both much broader than would be the 
case with customary rights as defined by Blackstone. However, there 
is some overlap as well; Native Hawaiian practices must be long 
standing and are subject to some reasonable government regulation. 
Hawai'i is far from the only area experiencing a resurgence of 
native customary law. The following case studies demonstrate that 
the re-emergence of customary law is truly a worldwide phenomenon. 
Customary law in Norway and Greenland were thoroughly analyzed 
in the Role of Customary Law in Sustainable Development, which 
traces the history of customary law, assesses the continued viability 
of custom as a source of law in contemporary societies, and argues 
that customary law may play a valuable role in sustainable develop-
ment. The following sections build off of that book by providing up-
dates on the status of customary law in both Norway and Greenland 
and also introduce studies into the role of native customary law in 
South Africa and New Zealand. 
B. Norway 
1. Customary Law in Norway-Generally 
Norwegian courts generally recognize local customs as law if the 
usage meets the general prerequisites of (1) longevity, (2) non-inter-
ruption, (3) freedom from dispute, and (4) reasonableness. 117 The Res-
urrection of Customary Laws, by Peter Orebech, provides a current 
and comprehensive analysis of recent applications of general custom-
ary law in Norway. lIS Additionally, the customary laws of the indige-
nous population of northern Norway, the Saami, have also received 
some recognition in recent years. 
For example, in 2005, the Norwegian government enacted the 
Finnmark Act, which transferred ownership of95% of the land of the 
117. Peter Orebech, How Custom Becomes Law in Norway, in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY 
DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 224, 240 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
118. Peter Orebech, Western Scandinavia: The Resurrection of Customary Laws, 48 TEX. 
INT'L L.J. 405 (2013). 
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northern district of Finnmark from the state to a new legal entity 
called the Finnmark Estate. 119 Section Five of the FinnmarkAct rec-
ognizes the customary basis for this transfer by stating "through 
prolonged use ofland and water areas, the Sami have collectively and 
individually acquired rights to land in Finnmark." 120 Similarly, Saami 
reindeer pastoral rights were affirmed by a 2001 court case on the 
basis of "immemorial usage." 121 Despite these and other successes, 
indigenous groups seeking to have their traditions recognized as law 
generally face an uphill battle, as the following case study of Sa ami 
fishing rights demonstrates. 
2. Saami Fishing Rights as Customary Law 
The indigenous coastal Saami of the northern district of Finnmark 
have traditionally practiced "open access" to the fisheries of that 
area. 122 In modern times, many Saami fishermen would like to have 
their tradition of open access to fisheries recognized as customary 
law123 in order to overturn conservation quotas imposed in 1992.124 
Peter Orebech argues that the Saami practice of open access fishing 
can achieve the status of customary law based on the uniformity 
of fishing practices within the geographic region. 125 Moreover, he 
argues that the local fishing practices in Finnmark meet the formal 
Norwegian prerequisites for recognition as customary law. 126 
119. See0yvindRavna, SamiRightsand Sami Law in Norway, in THE POLAR LAw TEXTBOOK 
II 269-89,288 (Natalia Loukacheva ed. 2013). 
120. Id. at 276. 
121. Id. at 280 (discussing the Selbu case). 
122. David Callies, Peter Orebech & Hanne Petersen, Case Studies: Hawaii, Norway and 
Greenland, in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 43, 60 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). Under the open access doctrine, all local fishermen were afforded 
equal access to ocean resources. Id. 
123. Id. at 57. 
124. Id. The Saami feel that the fishing quotas exclude local small-scale fishermen in favor 
oflarge-scale commercialfishing, while the national government favors fishing quotas in order 
to protect dwindling fish populations. Id. at 58. 
125. See Callies et aL, supra note 122, at 60. 
126. (1) The longevity requirement is met because the open access approach to fisheries can 
be proven to be at least over one hundred years old, (2) the non -interruption requirement is met 
because the fishermen ofFinnmark repeatedly confirm steadfast joint usage and have engaged 
in open access practice annually without interruption, (3) the peaceable and free from dispute 
requirement is met because local fishermen who were interviewed universally regarded the 
ocean as open access, and (4) the reasonableness requirement is met because the practice would 
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However, Norwegian courts have yet to recognize the Saami tradi-
tion of open access to fisheries as customary law-in fact, there has 
been no notable jurisprudence on the subject. 127 Moreover, the Nor-
wegian government has legislatively rejected the idea of special 
Saami rights to the fisheries ofFinnmark. 128 In 2006, the Norwegian 
government appointed a joint Saami-Norwegian Coastal Fishing 
Commission ("The Commission") to investigate the marine fisheries 
rights of the Saami and other residents of Finnmark. 129 In 2008, the 
Commission unanimously drafted and proposed the Finnmark Fish-
ery Act, which stated that all inhabitants of the geographic area of 
Finnmark, regardless of ethnicity, had equal rights to utilize the fish-
eries as well as priority over non-residents. 130 Interestingly, section 
thirteen of the Finnmark Fishery Act contained a reservation stating 
that it did not infringe upon existing individual or collective prop-
erty rights to the sea established by custom or usage. 131 
However, the Norwegian government declined to enact the Finn-
mark Fishery Act. 132 In 2009, the Fisheries Minister spurned the cen-
tral conclusion of the Commission by denying the existence of special 
fishing rights for the people of Finnmark. 133 In 2012, the Norwegian 
Parliament officially struck down the proposed Act by a vote of 106 to 
34. 134 The government agreed to implement modest measures pro-
tecting Saami access to maritime resources but, unlike the Commis-
sion, rejected the idea of general customary rights to the fisheries. 135 
give fishing a stable and predictable framework. David Callies, Peter Orebech & Hanne Petersen, 
The Case Studies Revisited, in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVEL-
OPMENT 411, 417-20 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
127. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Report on Indige-
nous Fishing Rights in the Seas with Case Studies from Australia and Norway 18 (2010), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documentslE. C.19.20 1O.2EN.pdf. 
128. See supra, note 127 and infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
129. Svein Jentoft, Governing Tenure in Norwegian and Sami Small-Scale Fisheries: From 
Common Pool to Common Property?, 1 LAND TENURE JOURNAL 91, 100 (2013), available at http:// 
www.fao.org/nr/tenurelland-tenure-journal/index.php/LT J larticle/view Articlel7 5. 
130. Id. at 101-2. The right of the people of Finnmark to use such fisheries was "based on 
historical use and the rules of international law on indigenous peoples" as well as on a constitu-
tional duty to protect Saami culture. See Report on Indigenous Fishing Rights, supra note 127. 
131. Camilla Brattland, Mapping Rights in Coastal Sami Seascapes, 1 ARCTIC REV. ON LAW 
AND POL. 28, 35 (2010). 
132. See Report on Indigenous Fishing Rights, supra note 127. 
133. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 104. 
134. See id. at 113. 
135. See id. at 103-04. 
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The fate of customary law as a means of regulating Norwegian 
fisheries is uncertain. The Norwegian government, like most govern-
ments, would clearly rather approach Finnmark fisheries law from 
within the framework of state legislation and management than cre-
ate room for customary law. 136 Even the Commission, which advocated 
for recognition of the traditional rights oflocal Finnmark fishermen, 
only discussed custom as a source of legal rights in one paragraph of 
the sixteen-part proposed Act. 137 Similarly, under the proposed Act, 
those claiming private or collective rights to fishing grounds were to 
direct claims to the Finnmark Commission138 rather than to a court. 139 
In sum, the Saami tradition of open access does not appear likely to 
achieve political recognition as customary law as long as the govern-
ment continues to approach the issue through a state regulatory 
framework. Meanwhile, the role of Saami customary law in Norwe-
gian courts remains undeveloped. 140 
Some Saami continue to work towards securing recognition of 
traditional fishing rights through the political process. 141 Others feel 
tha t the Norwegian courts should recognize fishing rights as custom-
ary law, 142 as advocated for by Peter Orebech. 143 Alternatively, the UN 
International Labour Organization and Tribal Peoples Convention 
No. 169 and the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
may provide an international law basis for recognition of customary 
fishing rights. 144 
136. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 110. 
137. The Commission was pushing towards a "regionalized, co-management model" of fish-
eries governance. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 108. 
138. The Finnmark Commission is a government entity established in 1995 to resolve Saami 
land rights issues. See Camilla Brattland, supra note 131, at 35. 
139. Id. 
140. "To date, the use of Sami customary law as a source of law in the courts is still in its 
initial phase. It therefore remains difficult to draw robust conclusions on its ultimate legal sig-
nificance. Thus far, case law points to the fact that Sami law has faced significant problems in 
working harmoniously with Norwegian law." See 0yvind Ravna, supra note 119, at 288. 
141. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 105. 
142. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 106. 
143. See supra, notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
144. Norway is a party to ILO Convention No. 169. SeeReport on Indigenous Fishing Rights, 
supra note 127. According to ILO Convention No. 169, Saami customs should have greater 
weight than Norwegian law in Saami rights questions. See Camilla Brattland, supra note 131, 
at 48. Despite international pressure to "finalize the process of clarifying Sami land and re-
source rightsL]" the Norwegian government regards its commitments as sufficiently fulfilled 
by the measures agreed to in 2011. See Svein Jentoft, supra note 129, at 110. 
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C. New Zealand 
1. Background 
On the other side of the world-in a situation somewhat similar 
to that of the Saami-the indigenous Maori of New Zealand are also 
fighting for recognition of their customary laws. Tikanga Maori, or the 
Maori system of customary laws,145 is comprised of oral traditions, 
rituals, and practices rather than codified statutes. 146 Tikanga Maori 
is rooted in core values that define right from wrong and underlay the 
formal rules of traditional Maori society.147 The Maori relied on 
tikanga Maori to inform decisions regarding leadership, social roles, 
access to resources, and to define various other rights, relationships, 
and practices. 148 
The Maori cite to a number of historic authorities in arguing that 
tikanga Maori is recognized as law by New Zealand. 149 First, the 
common law doctrine of Aboriginal Rights theoretically allows Maori 
customary law to be incorporated into the common law legal 
system. 150 Second, section II of the Treaty of Waitangi recognized 
the protected status of Maori customary law through the promise of 
"tinorangatiratanga."151 By 1896, the Waitangi Tribunalinterpreted 
this clause to require preservation of "all Maori valued customs 
and possessions," a mandate which arguably extends protection to 
tikanga Maori. 152 Third, tikanga Maori has been acknowledged, at 
145. "Tikanga Maori and Maori customary law are terms (not necessarily interchangeable) 
that embody the values, standards, principles, or norms that indigenous Maori had developed 
to govern themselves." Linda Te Aho, TikangaMaori, Historical Context, and the Interface with 
Pakeha Law in AotearoalNew Zealand, 10 YB. N.Z. JURIS. 10, 10 (2007). 
146. Robert Joseph, Recreating Legal Space for the First Law of Aotearoa-New Zealand, 17 
WAIKATOL. REV. 74,83 (2009). 
147. Id. Although the values differ from tribe to tribe, the core values include "(1) the 
importance of genealogy, (2) authority over who might exercise certain rights, (3) reciprocity, 
(4) sacredness and secularity, and (5) stewardship." See Linda Te Aho, supra note 145, at 11. 
148. Caren Fox, Access to Customary Law: New Zealand Issues, 13-14 YB. N.Z. JURIS. 224, 
228 (2011). 
149. See Robert Joseph, supra note 146, at 75-78. 
150. The common law doctrine of Aboriginal rights recognizes the continuation oflocal native 
law following British annexation. "Elements of Aboriginal rights maintained were those not 
repugnant to common law and which did not interfere with or challenge the new sovereign." 
Id. at 75. 
151. Tino rangatiratanga is translated into English as "the full exclusive and undisturbed 
possession of their ... other properties." Id. at 76. 
152. Id. at 75. 
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least peripherally, by various statutes. 153 Whether New Zealand will 
actually interpret these authorities in a manner that awards sweep-
ing and formal legal status to tikanga Maori remains uncertain. 154 
Meanwhile, the common law of New Zealand has gradually con-
ferred limited legal status on Maori customs and usage. As early as 
1847, New Zealand courts recognized the validity of native title to 
land,155 although the seminal 1877 case of Wi Parata v. Bishop of 
Wellington initially denied the existence of Maori customary law. 156 
The legal status of Maori custom was revived in 1901 when the Privy 
Council recognized that Maori customary law could be used to prove 
land tenure. 157 Soon after, in 1908, Public Trustee v. Loasby held that 
Maori customs could be raised at common law if a three-element test 
was met. 158 Realistically, because New Zealand operates under a com-
prehensive system of codified laws, the second element of the Loasby 
test severely limits the application oftikanga Maori. 159 Despite these 
and other recognitions of Maori rights in the common law, mainstream 
courts generally disfavor recognition of these customs as law. 160 
Additionally, the New Zealand parliament has "struggled with the 
notion of customary law and has consistently legislated to nullify 
the impact of any court decisions that it believes threatens its sov-
ereignty as the penultimate source of all law concerning Maori." 161 
The enactment of the 2004 Seabed Act provides an example of the 
parliament proactively legislating to supersede Maori customary 
rights recognized by courts. 162 In Ngati Apa v. Attorney General, Maori 
153. Id. at 64 (discussing the historic and contemporary statutes that recognize Maori 
customary law). 
154. See Caren Fox, supra note 148, at 229. 
155. The case of R v. Symonds recognized native title to land. See Linda Te Aho, supra note 
145, at 12. 
156. "Prendergast CJ found that the Maori had 'no settled system of law' and that an Act 
referring to the ancient custom of the Maori 'cannot call what is non-existent into being.'" See id.; 
see also Robert Joseph, supra note 146 (discussing in detail judicial denial of Maori custom). 
157. See Linda Te Aho, supra note 145, at 12. 
158. (1) Whether the custom could be factually proven by experts, (2) whether the custom 
was contrary to statute, and (3) whether the custom was reasonable from the judge's per-
spective.ld. 
159. Id. at 13. 
160. See Caren Fox, supra note 148, at 228. 
161. Id. at 237. 
162. See Linda Te Aho, supra note 145, at 14 (summarizing the court decision in NgatiApa 
v. Attorney General and the subsequent Seabed Act 2004); see also R. P. Boast, Foreshore and 
Seabed, Again, 9 NZJPIL 271 (2011) (discussing in detail the Seabed Act and the 2011 Marine 
and Coastal Area Act that replaced it). 
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customary rights to the foreshore and seabed were found to exist, to 
have survived British sovereignty, and to have not been explicitly ex-
tinguished by legislation. 163 The parliament responded with the 2004 
Seabed Act, which unambiguously extinguished the asserted Maori 
customary rights. 164 
The Waitangi Tribunal and the Maori Land Court are two legal 
institutions that currently attempt to integrate tikanga Maori into 
their operations. 165 The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975 to 
hear claims asserted by Maori regarding violations of the "principles 
of the Treaty ofWaitangi." 166 The Waitangi Tribunal actively consid-
ers evidence oftikanga Maori when evaluating claims. 167 It also allows 
testimony in the Maori language, considers evidence of custom by 
traditional witnesses, 168 and "brings together a mix of historical, legal, 
and tikanga Maori experts who analyze early settler and official ac-
counts with oral history." 169 Similarly, the Maori Land Court consid-
ers tikanga Maori when determining rights and interests in land170 
and is experimenting with new procedures and policies to further 
accommodate Maori values and practices. 171 
2. Customary Law in Sustainable Development 
The role of tikanga Maori in the management of New Zealand's 
fisheries provides a perfect example of the importance that custom-
ary law can play in achieving goals of sustainable development, as ex-
plored by Valmaine Toki.172 The Maori world-view inseparably links 
163. See Linda Te Aho, supra note 145, at 14. 
164. Id. 
165. These are the "two legal systems most closely aligned to the revitalization of tikanga 
Maori." See Caren Fox, supra note 148, at 231. 
166. Id. at 231. 
167. Id. at 233. 
168. This policy appears similar to the concept of the kama'aina witnesses in Hawai'i. See 
supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
169. See Caren Fox, supra note 148, at 232. 
170. Maori Tikanga has been applied "in relation to ascertaining rights and interests in land, 
including hearing evidence of Maori customary adoptions, Maori customary title, Maori succes-
sion practices, customary marriages, Maori genealogy, sacred sites, fishing grounds, and other 
places of importance." I d. at 234. 
171. These measures include involving traditional experts in the court, appointing judges 
versed in tikanga Maori, and requiring judges to attend annual Maori language and educational 
seminars.ld. at 235. 
172. Valmaine Toki, Adopting a Maori Property Rights Approach to Fisheries, 14 N.Z. J. 
ENVTL. L. 197 (2010). 
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humans and the natural environment in a unified cosmic order. 173 
Therefore, many aspects oftikanga Maori emphasize the sustainable 
management of resources. 174 Under tikanga Maori, fisheries were 
collectively utilized, but access and use was regulated in order to 
protect the resource itself and to ensure its availability for future 
generations. 175 
In 1986, New Zealand enacted the Fisheries Amendment Act, 
which introduced a fishing quota in order to protect dwindling fish 
populations. 176 The Maori appealed the Fisheries Amendment Act 
to the Waitangi Tribunal and the courts, arguing that it violated their 
customary fishing rights.177 The Waitangi Tribunal issued two re-
ports that "recognized that customary Maori fishing rights had a com-
mercial component and that such rights were capable of evolving as 
recognized commercial rights in fishing." 178 The Waitangi Tribunal 
further stated that the fishing quota had violated Maori customary 
rights and interfered with the Maori right to develop the fishery 
resource. 179 New Zealand courts adopted the findings of the Waitangi 
Tribunal. 180 In 1992, the Crown and the Maori entered into a settle-
ment agreement that established both Maori commercial fishing 
rights and customary gathering rights. 181 
The Maori Fisheries Act was passed in 2004 to allocate commercial 
fishery assets to the Maori. 182 Each Maori tribe received shares in a 
Maori-owned fisheries company, cash, and fishing quotas. 183 Essen-
tially, Maori customary rights to fisheries were converted into private 
property rights under Maori control. 184 Maori tribes and organiza-
tions' now endowed with commercial interests, are attempting to de-
velop organizational models that can balance financial objectives with 
173. Id. at 200. 
174. Id.; see also Linda Te Aho, supra note 145, at 11. 
175. See Valmaine Toki, supra note 172, at 200. 
176. This quota created a transferable private property right in commercial fish species. 
Id. at 206. 
177. Id. at 207. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. See id. at 208 (discussing the settlement terms). 
182. Id. at 207. 
183. The Maori company, Aotearoa Fisheries Limited, in turn, was granted partial or full 
ownership in a number of other large fishing and processing companies. Id. at 209. 
184. Id. 
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customary values and sustainable outcomes. 185 The Maori Fisheries 
Act mandated that Maori organizations receiving assets have paral-
lel commercial and traditional structures and prohibited transfer of 
assets away from the tribe. 186 The Maori Fisheries Act also codified 
the protected status of Maori customary fishing and gathering. 187 
New Zealand's recognition of Maori customary rights to fisheries 
and the subsequent transfer of commercial assets to Maori organiza-
tions represent an interesting blend of traditional and modern con-
siderations. This synthesis of customary and corporate values and 
organizations may provide a new framework for the sustainable 
development of resources. 188 
D. South Africa 
Large segments of the South African population continue to live 
under customary law,189 which is derived from oral tradition and 
emphasizes familial and communal values over individualism. 190 The 
goal of customary law is reconciliation between parties in conflict, and 
to that end, the law is non-specialized, often blending criminal and 
civil type cases. 191 Customary law was comprehensive before coloni-
zation but increasingly concerns only tort offense and family law. 192 
Customary practices become customary laws in one of two ways 
in South Africa. First, some traditional courts look to "living custom-
ary law." 193 Living customary law is derived from actual practices and 
usage in the community. 194 In this framework, customs and values are 
dynamic and are given the force of law because they are the true 
185. See Linda Te Aho, Corporate Governance: Balancing TikangaMaori with Commercial 
Objectives, 8 YB. N.Z. JURIS. 300 (2005) (discussing the role of tikanga Maori in Maori corpo-
rations); see also Valmaine Toki, supra note 172, at 210. 
186. See Valmaine Toki, supra note 172, at 212. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Hallie Ludsin, Cultural Denial: What South Africa's Treatment of Witchcraft Says for the 
Future of Its Customary Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 63, 70 (2003). 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Craig Bosch & Chum a Himonga, The Application of African Customary Law Under the 
Constitution of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning?, 117 S. AFRICAN L.J. 306, 
338 (2000). 
194. Id. at 319. 
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source of authority and organization in a community. 195 Scholars and 
activists often advocate for living customary law because it adapts 
to changing conditions, thus eliminating outdated practices and stay-
ing relevant. 196 This conception of custom as law is criticized because 
it is inherently flexible and inconsistent, as there is no requirement 
that the practice be ancient. 197 Accordingly, common law courts in the 
country, which favor customs that are certain and readily ascertain-
able, will not usually apply living customary law. 198 
Rather, South African common law courts apply what regional 
academics refer to as "official customary law." 199 Official customary 
law is determined by reference to customary practices that have been 
codified in court cases, secondary sources, anthropological reports, 
and government studies?OO Critics feel that official customary law is 
Westernized, stagnant, and undemocratic. 201 However, official custom-
ary law is clearly favored by government authorities, as it is readily 
ascertainable and more in line with legal positivism.202 
1. Treatment of Customary Law in Colonial South Africa 
Colonial governments in the geographic area that is now South 
Africa often had difficulties with traditional customary law?03 Colo-
nial authorities sometimes recognized the right of traditional lead-
ers to apply customary law yet at other times forced European legal 
systems onto indigenous populations.204 When the British and Dutch 
settlers of the region did recognize local customs as law, it was for 
pragmatic reasons, as the settlers believed both that recognition was 
necessary to keep native populations complacent and that European 
law was too sophisticated to be applied to indigenous cultures. 205 
South Africa was unified into a single nation in 1910. In 1927, South 
Africa solidified and defined the position of traditional customary 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 325. 
198. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 73. 
199. Id. at 72. 
200. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 329. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 307. 
204. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 66. 
205. Id. 
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law with the passage of the Black Administration Act. 206 The Black 
Administration Act applied only to native Africans, and was" designed 
to be comprehensive in reach, regulating administrative, judicial, and 
substantive matters such as the appointment of chiefs, establish-
ment of courts and jurisdiction, legal status, land tenure, marriages, 
and succession."207 It created a parallel system of traditional courts 
that were authorized to apply customary law, 208 which was comprised 
of "Chiefs and Headsman's Courts," with appeals heard by "Native 
Commissioner Courts."209 The traditional courts only had jurisdiction 
in cases in which both parties were black and in civil and minor crim-
ina I cases?lO The application of customary law was severely limited 
by the requirement that customary law could not be repugnant to 
"principles of public policy or natural justice."211 
In 1988 South Africa passed the Evidence Amendment Act, 212 which 
obligated all courts in South Africa to recognize customary laws 
"when applicable[,]" even if a party was not black.213 The application 
of customary law was made subject to two conditions: (1) it had to be 
proven with reasonable certainty, and (2) it could not be repugnant to 
principles of public policy or natural justice?14 The Evidence Amend-
ment Act reinforced the legal basis for indigenous custom as law.215 
However, the inclusion of the repugnancy clause ensured that custom-
ary law was relegated to a subordinate position. 216 
206. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 307. 
207. Sanele Sibanda, When is the Past Not the Past? Reflections on Customary Law Under 
South Africa's Constitutional Dispensation, 3 HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF 17 (2010). 
208. Chuma Himonga & Rashid Manjoo, The Challenges of Formalisation, Regulation, and 
Reform of Traditional Courts in South Africa, 3 MALAWI L.J. 157, 161 (2009). 
209. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 307. 
210. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 71. 
211. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 308. "The Public Policy to which the courts would refer 
was an embodiment of the sentiments of the small, dominant, white population of South 
Mrica." Id. 
212. The Evidence Amendment Act states in relevant part: 
(1) Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of indig-
enous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with sufficient 
certainty: Provided that indigenous law shall not be opposed to the principles of 
public policy or natural justice: Provided further that it shall not be lawful for 
any court to declare that the custom of lobola or bogadi or other similar custom 
is repugnant to such principles. 
See Bosch, supra note 193, at 307. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 308. 
215. Id. at 307. 
216. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 67. 
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In sum, during colonial and apartheid South Africa, customary 
law enjoyed official status. However, the jurisdiction of traditional 
courts applying customary laws was limited to cases in which cus-
tomary law "was applicable." 217 In practice, customary law was usu-
ally applied in family- and tort-type cases and was restricted from 
regulating important areas oflaw such as land title or succession. 218 
Additionally, the repugnancy requirements of the Black Administra-
tion Act and the Evidence Amendment Act prevented the application 
of customary law in areas where it conflicted with common law. For 
example, in the 1983 case of Ismail v. Ismail, a South African court 
struck down a traditional polygamous marriage performed under 
customary law as being against public policy.219 Customary law and 
the traditional court system were arguably used as "instrument[s] 
for entrenching a uniform system of indirect rule in South Africa, 
whereby traditional leaders became state agents in administering 
the affairs over whom they were appointed to rule.,,220 
2. Legal Bases in the 1996 Constitution of South Africa 
With the fall of apartheid in South Africa, the crafters of the new 
government agreed to strengthen the status of customary law in South 
Africa.221 The Interim Constitution of 1993 gave "relatively wide rec-
ognition to customary law and its institutions, thus ensuring a dis-
tinct elevation in its status in the national legal system."222 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
("Constitution") further formalized the position of customary law. 223 
The Constitution's Chapter Twelve on Traditional Leaders implicitly 
and explicitly provides a legal basis for customary law in numerous 
sections?24 First, sections fifteen, thirty, thirty-one, and thirty-two 
collectively provide for "a right to culture."225 The right to culture 
217. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 307. 
218. T.W. Bennett & C.H. Powell, Restoring Land: The Claims of Aboriginal Title, Customary 
Law, and the Right to Culture, 16 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 431, 440 (2005). 
219. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 308. 
220. See Sibanda, supra note 207, at 32. 
221. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68. 
222. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 309 (discussing the provisions of the Interim Constitution 
in great detail). 
223. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68. 
224. Id. 
225. Section 31, for example, provides that "[elvery person shall have the right to use the 
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arguably includes the right to live by culturally based customary 
laws, because culture is often defined to include legal systems. 226 
Second, sections 211(1) and (2) "recognize the institution, status, and 
role of traditional leadership, according to customary law[,]"227 and 
allow traditional leadership to govern locally, "subject to custom and 
legislation."228 Third, section 212 calls for future legislation to em-
power traditional leaders to deal with "customary law and the cus-
toms of communities observing a system of customary law." 229 Fourth, 
customary law and common law are mentioned as equals in Section 
39(2) and (3).230 In particular, section 39(3) allows for people to raise 
claims of rights conferred by customary law, although it does not 
grant an affirmative right to customary law.231 Fifth, and most signif-
icantly, section 211(3) explicitly mandates that "the courts must apply 
customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution 
and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law." 232 This 
mandatory duty imposed by section 211(3) distinguishes it from sim-
ilar language in the Black Administration Act, which left the appli-
cation of customary law to the court's discretion?33 
However, the potential application of customary law under the 
Constitution is limited by several clauses. For example, section 211(3) 
provides for the mandatory application of customary law only "when 
applicable." 234 In many situations it is not clear whether customary 
or common law should apply, and there are few existing authoritative 
language and to participate in the culture of his or her choice." See Bosch, supra note 193, at 310; 
see also Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68. 
226. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 310. 
227. Id. at 313. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
In terms of s 39(2): 'When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.' Whereas in terms of s 39(3): 'The 
Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent 
that they are consistent with the Bill.' 
Id. at 313 n.4. (emphasis in original). 
231. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68. 
232. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 313. 
233. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68 n.28. 
234. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 314. 
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guidelines?35 Likewise, section 211(3) provides that customary law is 
applied subject to the Constitution, which includes the Bill of Rights. 
Proponents of customary law fear that aspects of customary law that 
run counter to principles of equality in the Bill of Rights may be 
struck entirely?36 Such proponents advocate instead for the courts 
to "develop" customary laws until they are in line with the "spirit" of 
the Bill of Rights. 237 Similarly, Schedule 6, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion holds that all legislation adopted prior to the Constitution re-
mains in force until repealed. 238 Thus, the repugnancy clause of the 
Evidence Amendment Act of 1988 may survive and further limit the 
application of customary law.239 Finally, there is no explicitly stated af-
firmative right to be governed by customary law in the Constitution. 240 
3. Substantive Developments Since 1996 
Despite its ambiguities, the Constitution has reinvigorated the 
standing of customary law in South Africa by forming the legal basis 
for contemporary developments and reforms of customary law?41 
However, the status of customary law, and the form that it should 
take, are still the subject of debate. 242 
South African Courts have struggled to apply customary law in a 
manner that is consistent with the Bill of Rights. The three cases 
discussed below demonstrate the complex legal landscape that courts 
must navigate when applying customary laws while at the same time 
attempting to uphold constitutionally protected gender equality rights. 
The 1997 case of Mthembu v. Letsela considered the viability of 
the practice ofprimogeniture243 as customary law.244 The plaintiff was 
a widow with one daughter, while the defendant was the father of the 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 317. 
237. Id. 
238. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 68. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. See Sibanda, supra note 207, at 32. 
242. Id. at 34. 
243. The customary practice male primogeniture mandates that the eldest male descendant 
inherits property "to the exclusion of female relatives and younger male relatives" in exchange 
for the obligation to provide for dependents. Id. at 33. 
244. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 332. 
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plaintiff s deceased husband. The plaintiff had married her husband 
under customary law and did not dispute that customary rules of suc-
cession applied. However, the plaintiff argued that under the new 
Constitution the rule of primogeniture was gender discriminatory. 245 
Accordingly, the plaintiff asked the Court to modify the customary 
law in order to allow her daughter, as the deceased's sole heir, to in-
herit the property.246 The High Court, after considering evidence of 
customary practices in the form of archives and testimony from expert 
witnesses, determined that primogeniture was not gender discrimina-
tory, because it required the male inheritor to provide for any widows 
and female descendants of the deceased.247 The Court thus upheld 
primogeniture as customary law and applied the law accordingly. This 
decision was superseded by the decision of the Constitutional Court 
in Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha and the "RCSA" of 2009. 248 
In 1997, a South African court considered the case of Mabena v. 
Letsoalo.249 Mabena involved a dispute between a widow's family 
and the deceased husband's family over the validity of the customary 
law marriage between the couple. 250 The husband's family argued 
that the customary marriage was invalid because the mother of the 
bride had negotiated it, while traditionally the father performed such 
marriage negotiations?51 The court noted that males traditionally 
arranged customary marriages, according to official records on cus-
tomary law.252 However, the court also considered evidence that in 
contemporary culture the custom had shifted to allow women to per-
form marriages?53 The court upheld the validity of the marriage, thus 
modifying the customary law of marriage to comport with the Con-
stitution and shifting community practices.254 
The Constitutional Court recently modified the customary marriage 
practice of polygamy in the 2013 case of Mayelane v. Ngwenyama 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. 
248. See Himonga, supra note 208, at 179; see also infra notes 267-69 and accompanying text. 
249. See Bosch, supra note 193, at 335. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 336. 
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and the Minister for Home Affairs?55 The court invalidated a man's 
marriage to a second wife based on the finding that his first wife did 
not consent to the second marriage.256 In doing so, the court held 
that the first wife's consent was necessary for a valid polygamous 
marriage?57 The court considered this the best compromise in order 
to bring the customary law of polygamous marriage in line with the 
requirement of gender equality in the Reform of Customary Mar-
riages Act and the Bill of Rights. 258 
Additionally, in the decades since the end of Apartheid and the 
passing of the Constitution, the South African legislature has con-
sidered, and sometimes passed, a number of bills specifically relating 
to customary law. 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act of 1998 ("RCMA") 
extends official State recognition to traditional marriages performed 
under customary law. 259 The RCMA created a system of registration 
for customary marriages, including polygamous marriages, and ap-
plies to marriages entered into before and after passage of the Act. 260 
The legislature brought the customary laws regarding traditional 
marriage in line with the Bill of Rights by making women equal 
partners in marriage and mandating that ownership of property be 
shared?61 However, critics point out that beyond "idiosyncratic tin-
kering to accommodate polygyny ... there is now little substantive 
or procedural difference from the common law when it comes to 
customary marriage."262 
The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act of 
2003 ("TLGFA") lays out the powers and responsibilities of tradi-
tionalleaders.263 The TLG FA aims to restore the legitimacy oftradi-
tionalleaders, stating that they should be appointed according to 
255. Chuma Himonga, Mayelanev. Ngwenyama andMinister for HomeAffairs: A Reflection 
on Wider Implications, CUSTOM CONTESTED (Jan. 25, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.custom 
contested.co.za/mayelane-v-ngwenyama-and-minister-for-home-affairs-a-reflection-on-wider 
-implications/. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. 
259. See Sibanda, supra note 207, at 33. 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. See Himonga, supra note 208, at 162. 
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customary practices and should work to clarify and develop customary 
la w. 264 The TLG FA attempts to bring traditional leaders in line with 
the Constitution by requiring gender equality and a one-third presence 
of women in traditional councils.265 
The customary succession practice of male primogeniture, under 
which the eldest male descendant inherits property "to the exclusion 
of female relatives and younger male relatives" in exchange for the 
obligation to provide for dependents, was declared unconstitutional 
in the 2007 Constitutional Court case of Bhe v. Magistrate Khayelitsha 
and Others?66 The Reform of Customary Law of Succession Act and 
Regulation of Related Matters Act of 2009 ("RCSA") codified the Bhe 
court's finding and statutorily overrode customary law by requiring 
that female and younger male relatives inherit their fair share. 267 It 
is argued that succession under customary law now mirrors its com-
mon law counterpart. 268 
The South African legislature has struggled to pass a bill that 
would redefine the role of traditional courts269 applying customary 
law.270 The South African Law Reform Commission ("The Commis-
sion") began investigating the role of customary law and traditional 
courts in 1996. The Commission did extensive research, consultations, 
and studies on how best to reform traditional courts and in 2003 sub-
mitted a report and draft bill to the South African Department of Jus-
tice. In 2005, the Legislature repealed the Black Amendment Act but 
temporarily extended provisions regulating traditional courts until 
replacement legislation was passed. 271 The Department of Justice did 
not introduce the Commission's draft bill to the Legislature and in-
stead began its own review and drafting process in 2006.272 In 2008, 
264. B. Mmusinyane, The Role of Traditional Authorities in Developing Customary Laws 
in Accordance With the Constitution: Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa, POTCHEFSTROOMSE 
ELEKTRONIESE REGSBLAD 161 (2009), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/journalsIPER/2009 
115.html. 
265. Id. 
266. See Sibanda, supra note 207, at 33. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. As discussed above, traditional courts were established by the Black Administration Act 
of 1927 and are viewed by many as having been used as a tool of oppression. See Sibanda, supra 
note 207, at 162; see also Ludsin, supra note 189, at 71. 
270. See Himonga, supra note 208, at 163. 
271. Id. 
272. Id. at 166. 
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the Department of Justice's Traditional Courts Bill was introduced 
into the legislature, in which it generated enormous and divisive 
controversy.273 The Traditional Courts Bill failed to pass in 2009 and 
again floundered upon its reintroduction in 2011.274 To date, the 
legislature has not passed the Traditional Courts Bil1.275 
The Legislature's difficulty with the Traditional Courts Bill high-
lights contemporary debates on the role of customary law in South 
Africa.276 Almost all sides in the dispute agree that the Constitution 
recognizes traditional justice systems and customary laws. There is 
also a general consensus that the State should support customary 
law systems and work to bring customary laws in line with the 
Constitu tion. 277 
The devil is in the details. For example, stakeholders disagree 
about whether individuals should be able to opt out of the customary 
law system.278 Likewise, they disagree on whether appeals from deci-
sions of the traditional justice system should go to higher traditional 
courts or directly to common law courts. 279 The degree of female par-
ticipation that should be required in traditional courts is at issue. 28o 
Whether legally trained attorneys or traditional individuals should 
staff courts is also a point of contention.281 Additionally, some see the 
Traditional Courts Bill as an attempt to put the indigenous population 
under the control of broadly empowered traditionalleaders. 282 
E. Greenland 
Native populations do not always seek to elevate their traditional 
customs to formal law. For example, in Greenland, customary law has 
273. Id. at 166. 
274. Traditional Courts Bill (TCB), CUSTOM CONTESTED (July 18, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www 
.customcontested.co. zallaws -and -policies/tra ditional-courts-bill-tcb/. 
275. Id. 
276. See Himonga, supra note 208, at 163. 
277. Id. at 166. 
278. Id. at 167. 
279. Id. at 167. 
280. Id. at 167. The current wording of the Traditional Courts Bill ensures that women may 
participate in court but does not ensure that they will be decision makers. Id. at 172. 
281. Id. at 172. Currently, in traditional courts lawyers are barred, and the traditionalleaders 
cross examine witnesses themselves. See Ludsin, supra note 189, at 71. 
282. See Sibanda, supra note 207, at 34. 
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been largely abandoned even though the ruling government is almost 
entirely composed of indigenous persons. Much like in South Africa, 
the situation in Greenland provides a good example of the complex re-
lationship between customary practices and modern realities among 
some indigenous populations. 
In the first part of the twentieth century, customs largely defined 
life in Greenland. 283 In particular, hunting was closely linked with the 
customary way ofliving.284 As Greenland has developed, customary 
ways of living have been replaced by more modern lifestyles, espe-
cially in the most populous parts of the island?85 Although Greenland 
has a large indigenous population and has been under indigenous 
home rule since 1979,286 the government of Greenland has neglected 
to implement custom as a source of law?87 Custom has not been in-
tegrated into law due to foreign elements in the central government, 
the strongly local nature of customs, apathy towards customary life 
among young Greenlanders and women, and the fact that the govern-
ment has no need to rely on customs in order to achieve legitimacy. 288 
In particular, the transformation from hunting-based lifestyles to a 
modern society has revolutionized gender roles, which has had a neg-
ative effect on the continued viability of certain gender-based customs. 
However, some G reenlandic customs survive as myths and watered-
down traditions that have become integrated into modern ways 
283. Custom largely determined ways of living within extended families, organization in 
communal activities such as hunting and sharing food, and defining gender roles. See Callies 
et aL, supra note 122, at 72. 
284. Greenlanders hunted seals, whales, and caribou. Hunting was seen as a means of 
survival, an important public activity, a cohesive way of structuring the community, and a source 
of identity. See Callies et aL, supra note 122, at 70-72. 
285. Under Danish rule, "a social democratic, modernized, industrial way oflife" was intro-
duced as a "political, economic, and legal modeL" See Callies et aL, supra note 122, at 66. 
286. Until 1953 Greenland was a Danish colony. From 1953 to 1957 Greenland was an equal 
part of the Danish realm. From 1979 to 2009 Greenland had home rule, under which a Green-
landic parliament and government were established while judiciary remained Danish. See 
Callies et aL, supra note 122, at 66. 
287. The Greenland government has adopted a Danish legal system because it is heavily 
dependent on imported academic staff from Denmark and looks to outside models of governance 
for guidance. See Callies et aL, supra note 122, at 67. 
288. See Callies et aL, supra note 122, at 68-69. "Especially in the early years of home rule, 
the mere fact that representatives were Greenlandic, endowed them with a strong legitimacy, 
which probably did not need a strong underpinning through explicit and formal consideration 
of customs in home rules regulations." Id. 
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of living. 289 Greenlandic customs often emphasize dependence on 
nature and sustainable practices?90 Curiously though, Greenlanders 
do not necessarily regard customary practices as superior in achiev-
ing sustainability.291 
In 2009, Greenland achieved "Self-Rule," which replaced Home 
Rule. 292 The Self-Rule Act granted Greenland expanded power to ex-
ercise executive, legislative, and judicial power in a number of fields. 293 
The Act also established procedures for the eventual independence 
ofGreenland?94 The expanded autonomy under Self-Rule, especially 
in the area of the courts, may allow for greater integration of custom-
ary law into Greenland governance.295 
For example, customary law may playa role in the future of the 
Greenland judiciary. Greenland utilizes a Danish-style justice system 
and has not yet created a separate indigenous legal system?96 How-
ever, local customs play an informal role in the justice system. 297 
Under the judicial system created in 1956, Danish-style laws are ad-
ministered, but lay assessors and lay judges administer local courts. 298 
These lay judges informally incorporate customary laws into the 
judicial system by taking traditional ways of thinking into consider-
a tion when rendering discretionary decisions. 299 As of 2010, the courts 
remained under the control of Denmark but, under the provisions 
289. See Callies et aL, supra note 126, at 424. 
290. See Callies et aL, supra note 126, at 424. 
291. In fact, many customary practices, such as hunting, may conflict with environmental 
regulations and a Western idea of sustainability, although such hunting practices were tradi-
tionally sustainable. See Callies et aL, supra note 126, at 427. 
292. This Act was passed by the Danish parliament following two Self-Rule Commissions 
and a referendum in Greenland. Mininnguaq Kleist, Greenland's Self-Governance, in THE POLAR 
LAW TEXTBOOK I 171, 171 (Natalia Loukacheva ed. 2010). 
293. THE GREENLAND SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT, STATMINISTERIET, http://www.stm 
.dk/_a_2957.html (last visited June 1, 2015). 
294. Id. 
295. However, some academics doubt that true Inuit self-governance, in terms of customary 
law, can ever occur under the framework of a foreign, Western-style government. See NATALIA 
LOUKACHEVA, THE ARCTIC PROMISE: LEGAL AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY OF GREENLAND AND 
NUNAVUT 64 (Univ. of Toronto Press Inc. 2007). 
296. Id. at 79. The Inuit possessed a legal framework that depended on myths, elders, 
shamans, traditional ceremonies, and self-restraint to maintain order. Id. at 85. 
297. Id. at 91. 
298. Lay assessors and lay judges have limited legal training but are recruited from the local 
population and speak Greenlandic. Id. 
299. Id. 
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of the Self-Rule Act, will eventually be transferred to Greenland, 300 a 
transition that some academics hope will allow for greater incorpo-
ration ofInuit customary law into the court systems. 30! 
The state of customary law in Greenland provides an interesting 
contrast to the other nations discussed in this section. Although 
Greenland's government is comprised of an Inuit majority that is 
sensitive to Inuit concerns and working towards autonomy,302 native 
traditions, structures, and values continue to playa minimal role in 
the governance of Greenland. 303 Clearly there is a complex interplay 
between native customary law, formal Western-style government, 
and indigenous populations. 
III. THE ApPLICATION OF CUSTOM IN U.S. TAKINGS LAW: 
"BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES" SAFE HAVEN FOR GOVERNMENT IN 
TOTAL REGULATORY TAKINGS 
A. Lucas and ''Background Principles" 
The most significant and far-reaching effect of customary law in 
the United States exists in the context ofland use. In the 1992 case 
of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,304 the United States 
Supreme Court created its now famous "categorical rule" for regula-
tory takings. Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, the rule requires the government to provide just com-
pensation whenever it denies a property owner all "economically ben-
eficial use" ofland. 305 Neither the purposes behind the denial nor the 
circumstances under which the land is acquired can diminish the gov-
ernment's liability.306 
The Lucas Court did, however, establish two exceptions to the 
otherwise inflexible" categorical rule," declaring that the rule does not 
apply if, first, the challenged regulation prevents a nuisance or, sec-
ond, the regulation is grounded in a state's background principles of 
300. See Mininnguaq Kleist, supra note 292, at 184. 
301. See NATALIA LOUKACHEVA, supra note 295, at 79. 
302. Id. at 64. 
303. Id. at 65. 
304. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
305. Id. at 1019. 
306. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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property law .307 Because the law of nuisance is full and comprehensive 
as well as comprehensible, the first exception presents little diffi-
culty.308 Leaving nothing to chance, the Lucas Court explained that 
the nuisance exception would allow the government to prohibit the 
construction of a power plant on an earthquake fault line or the fill-
ing of a lake-bed that was likely to result in flood damage to a neigh-
bor without incurring takings liability.309 By contrast, the Court was 
silent with respect to the meaning of the second exception of "back-
ground principles of state property law."310 
A major and often unexplored question in takings law is the extent 
of the background principles exception. The subject is important for 
two distinct reasons. First, it is not always easy to discern what com-
prises such background principles. Second, once defined, the princi-
ples can, when subject to expansive interpretation, seriously erode 
the basic Lucas doctrine meant to provide compensation for regula-
tory takings that deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use 
ofland. A related issue is the extent to which background principles 
analysis overlaps with the continuing discussion of the role of invest-
ment-backed expectations in Lucas situations (there should be none) 
and the so-called "notice" rule arguably raised by pre-existing state 
statutes in either total (Lucas) or partial (Penn Central Transporta-
tion) taking analyses. 
Although Lucas failed to provide explicit guidance concerning the 
definition of the background principles exception, it noted that 
restrictions premised upon such principles "inhere in landowner's 
307. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020-32. 
308. See, e.g., M&J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
coal company had no right to conduct nuisance-like activities while surface mining in West 
Virginia); Aztec Minerals Corp. v. Romer, 940 P.2d 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding the same 
under Colorado nuisance law); see also Colo. Dep't of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993 (Colo. 
1994) (en bane) (holding that federal statutes restricting the disposition of uranium mine tail-
ings fell within the background principles exception so as to deny a landowner use of a sixty-
one acre parcel, even though the applicable statutes were enacted after the landowner acquired 
the property). For a collection of recent exemption cases (and a summary of takings law gen-
erally), see ROBERTMELTZET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE 167-95 (1999); DavidL. Callies, Regulatory 
Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights Have Changed from 
Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON 
L. REv. 523 (1999). 
309. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. 
310. Id. at 1029-30. 
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title itself."311 On the basis of this statement, governments312 and 
commentators313 have turned to state common law property doctrines 
to identify underlying title limitations and, thus, background princi-
pIes. From this scrutiny, it is now clear that at least three sources of 
state property restrictions may qualify as background principles 
within the meaning of Lucas: statutory law existing prior to the ac-
quisition of land, 314 custom,315 and public trust. 
B. The Oregon Cases on Custom 
Several courts in the United States have declared public rights or 
rights of a huge class of strangers to cross private land based ex-
clusively on some version of customary law. Perhaps the most fa-
mous of these is State ex reZ. Thornton v. Hay,316 in which plaintiffs 
sought to prevent the Hays from constructing improvements on the 
dry-sand beach portion of their lot between the high water line and the 
upland vegetation line. Rejecting the proffered bases ofprescriptive 
rights and easements, the court decided in favor of the plaintiffs sua 
311. Id. at 1029. 
312. See Michael M. Berger, Inverse Condemnation and Related Governmental Liability, 
ALI-ABA Course of Study, Annual Update on Inverse Condemnation 11, 35 (Oct. 1996) (noting 
that" [s ]ince Lucas, government agencies have been combing their archives in search of arcane 
matters that might be said to have been part of a property owners' title and that severely 
restricts the use of land"). 
313. See Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of 
Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands 
and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that the public trust 
is a "background principle" that allows regulation of barrier beaches without just compensa-
tion); Katherine E. Stone, Sand Rights: A Legal System to Protect the "Shores of the Sea," 29 
STETSON L. REV. 709 (2000) (arguing that the public trust doctrine can be expanded to restrict 
development on non-trust lands for the purposes of preserving public beaches without trig-
gering a taking). 
314. See generally R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory 
Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449 (2001) (discussing the role of pre-existing statutes 
in regulatory takings analysis). 
315. See David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrections of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial 
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1996); David L. Callies, Custom and Public Trust: Background 
Principles of State Property Law?, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003 (2000); Paul M. Sullivan, Customary 
Revolutions: The Law of Custom and the Conflict of Traditions in Hawai'i, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 
99 (1999) (discussing the analysis of custom, including its application to takings). 
316. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). 
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sponte, extending customary rights to virtually the entire population 
of Oregon along its entire coastline: 
Because many elements of prescription are present in this case, 
the state has relied upon the doctrine in support of the decree 
below. We believe, however, that there is a better legal basis for 
affirming the decree. The most cogent basis for the decision in this 
case is the English doctrine of custom. Strictly construed, pre-
scription applies only to the specific tract ofland before the court, 
and doubtful prescription cases could fill the courts for years with 
tract-by -tract litigation. An established custom, on the other hand, 
can be proven with reference to a larger region. Ocean -fron t lands 
from the northern to the southern border of the state ought to be 
treated uniformly. 317 
Lest the reach of custom be misunderstood in aper se, total regulatory 
takings context under Lucas, the same court in Stevens v. City of 
Cannon Beach 318 responded to a takings claim over the refusal of local 
government to grant a seawall permit on customary rights interfer-
ence grounds and held that the customary law of Oregon preventing 
such construction was a background principle of state property law 
and therefore an exception to the categorical totals taking rule when 
a property owner was left with no economically beneficial use of 
his land. 
CONCLUSION 
Custom is nsmg Phoenix-like from the ashes of Blackstone's 
limitations on the English common law that forms the basis of com-
mon law in the United States. It arises both from renewed interest in 
the rights of Native Americans and from the background principles 
of state property law exception to the doctrine of regulatory taking. 
In the first, custom can provide a means for guaranteeing certain 
rights of native peoples in lands owned (technically held in fee simple) 
by others. The argument that a true customary right survives trans-
fer from one owner to another is strong, although, as the cases in the 
foregoing sections demonstrate, custom is always subject to control 
and destruction by legislative act. The growing recognition of native 
317. Id. at 676. 
318. 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993). 
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customary rights has assumed global proportions. However, as the 
above international case studies demonstrate, it can be difficult to 
integrate systems built around indigenous customary laws into mod-
ern statutory schemes. 
In the second, custom can provide a basis for a local, state, or federal 
land use regulation that will survive constitutional challenge as a tak-
ing of property without compensation even if it leaves a landowner 
with no economically beneficial use of the land. Akin to its twin nui-
sance exception, such a background principle ofa state's law of prop-
erty is not a part of the landowner's bundle of ownership sticks to 
begin with, so that its "taking by regulation" -like the perpetration of 
a nuisance-is not protected by the Constitution's Fifth Amendment. 
Property rights, however, and particularly private property rights, 
are hedged with restrictions governing rights in the land of another 
such as easements, profits, licenses, and covenants. One with no right 
to enter the land of another is a trespasser, as is demonstrated by 
a majority of land cases. This right to exclude is a critical part of 
American jurisprudence with respect to private property rights. As 
the American Law Institute noted in its Restatement of the Law of 
Property: 
A possessory interest in land exists in a person who has a physical 
relation to the land of a kind which gives a certain degree of phys-
ical control over the land, and an intent so to exercise such con-
trol as to exclude other members of society in general from any 
present occupation of the land. 319 
Another commentator describes the "notion of exclusive possession" 
as "implicit in the basic conception of private property."320 The Su-
preme Court has many times made the same point. Thus, in Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States321 : 
In this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so universally held 
to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within 
this category of interests that the Government cannot take without 
compensation. This is not a case in which the Government is 
319. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 7 (1936). 
320. RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
63 (1985). 
321. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
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exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an 
insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property; rather, 
the imposition of the ... servitude ... will result in an actual 
physical invasion of the privately owned marina. And even if the 
Government physically invades only an easement in the property, 
it must nonetheless pay just compensation. 322 
Again, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 323: 
Moreover, an owner suffer a special kind of injury when a stranger 
directly invades and occupies the owner's property. As [another 
part of the opinion] indicates, property law has long protected an 
owner's expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least 
in the possession of his property. To require, as well, that the 
owner permit another to exercise complete dominion literally 
adds insult to injury. Furthermore, such an occupation is quali-
tatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even 
a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since 
the owner may have no control over the timing, extent or nature 
of the invasion. 324 
195 
Indeed, the right to exclude has achieved international status with 
the 1999 opinion of the European Court of Human Rights in Case of 
Chassagnou and Others v. France. 325 Before the Court was the French 
Loi Verdeille326 which provides for the statutory pooling of hunting 
grounds. The effect on the plaintiffs (three farmers) was to force them 
to become members of a municipal hunters' association and to trans-
fer hunting rights to the association, with the result that all mem-
bers of the association may enter their property for the purpose of 
hunting. 327 The government of France claimed that the interference 
with the applicants' property rights was minor since they had not been 
deprived of the right to use their property, and all they lost was the 
right to prevent other people from hunting on their land. 
However, the Court found that while it was "undoubtedly in the 
general interest to avoid unregulated hunting and encourage the 
322. Id. at 179-80 (citations omitted). 
323. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
324. Id. at 436 (citations omitted; emphasis included). 
325. 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (1999) 
326. Law No. 64-696 of July 10, 1964. 
327. Chassagnou, 3 Eur. Ct. HR. 23, 'Il 13. 
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traditional management of game stocks,"328 (clearly the purpose of 
the Loi Verdeille), the interference with the applicants' fundamental 
right to peaceful enjoyment of their land was" disproportionate": 
[N]otwithstanding the legitimate aims of the Loi Verdeille when 
it was adopted, the Court place the applicants in a situation which 
upsets the fair balance to be struck between protection of the right 
of property and the requirements of the general interest. Com-
pelling small landowners to transfer hunting rights over their land 
so that others can make use of them in a way which is totally in-
compatible with their beliefs imposes a disproportionate burden 
which is not j ustified. 329 
Such obvious intrusions on private property-in particular the well-
documented right to exclude needs-must comply with certain re-
strictions and criteria common to the concept of custom. Blackstone 
provides such criteria not only as a matter of reason but also as a 
matter oflaw because he is almost always cited in the reported Amer-
ican cases on custom and customary law. 
As the discussion in section IV of this Article demonstrates, 
American courts usually get it wrong. Of the seven criteria set out in 
the Commentaries, the most critical appear to be certainty, reason-
ableness, and continuity. Contrary to the language in the Thornton 
case from Oregon, reasonableness is not a matter of present use but 
of original legal unfairness at its inception. Customs that unduly bur-
den property rights of the landowner or which favor unduly one group 
or person over others are unreasonable. If a custom is reasonable in 
these terms at its inception, then it is reasonable. Thus the court's 
statement that "reasonableness is satisfied by evidence that the 
public has always made use of the land in a manner appropriate to 
the land and to the usages of the community"330 is beside the point 
and wrong. 
The Blackstonian criterion of certainty goes to the clarity of the 
customary practice or right, the restrictive certainty as to locale (some 
legally recognized division like a county, a city, a town, or a village), 
and certainty as to a class of persons or section of the public. The 
328. Id. 'Il 79. 
329. Id. 'Il 85. 
330. 462 P.2d 671, 677 (Or. 1969). 
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Thornton court's statement that "certainty is satisfied by the visible 
boundaries of the dry sand area and by the character of the land, 
which limits the use thereof to recreation uses connected with the 
foreshore,,331 is vague as to the first requirement, far too broad with 
respect to the second, and altogether fails to deal with the third. 
As to continuity, the court says that a "customary right need not 
be exercised continuously, but it must be exercised without an inter-
ruption caused by anyone possessing a paramount right." 332 True for 
the first part, false for the second part. As Blackstone (and the cases) 
make abundantly clear, it is the right of use which must be continu-
ous. The use itself goes to evidence of that continuity of right, but 
the use itself is otherwise irrelevant. 
To sum up, American courts cite (appropriately) Blackstone when 
finding custom as a basis for permitting what would otherwise be a 
trespass on private land. Unfortunately, they usually get it so wrong 
that the basis in custom must certainly fail. Without another basis 
for justifying such invasive intrusions on private property, those 
exercising such rights are trespassing, and governments that permit 
(or require) such trespass are taking private property without com-
pensation contrary to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 
Custom is amorphously defined somewhat differently when refer-
ring to customary practices of native and/or indigenous people. Na-
tive customs are usually defined as a usage or practice over time that 
is universally recognized as a rule governing behavior by most if not 
all people affected by it. Some add that the custom responds to spe-
cific societal needs over time. Others, like the expert and commenta-
tor Peter Orebech, would argue that the practice needs to be public, 
justified, reasonable, and morally well founded. 333 In Hawai'i such 
indigenous customs have been recognized as a defense to trespass, 
although they are subject to certain criteria and limitations. 
It is clear that the proper role and scope of custom as a source of 
law will continue to be an important and controversial topic both in 
the United States and abroad well into the twenty-first century. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. 
333. Peter Orebech, How Custom Becomes Law in Norway, in THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY 
DEVELOPMENT IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 224, 233-40 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005). 
